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Abstract
This paper explores the concentration of audit services provided to listed public companies
on the Stock Exchanges of Canada, Hong Kong, London, and Singapore. The Canadian and
London stock exchanges are chosen as representatives of the North American and European
markets, while the Hong Kong and Singapore exchanges represent the newly developed
Asia Pacific markets. Public accounting firms have benefited from the globalisation trends
by expanding their own markets. The reason frequently mentioned for the mergers of the
Big 8 accounting firms to form the Big 6 is that they want to increase their international
presence and be in a better position to service multinationals in different markets. However, previous studies of concentration of firms in providing auditing services have all been
restricted to the USA or individual countries. This study uses both concentration ratios and
Herfindahl indices to examine concentration of audit firms in the international stock exchanges. The results indicate a disparate competition amongst the larger firms in each of
the Canadian, Hong Kong, London, and Singapore markets. In all of the four markets, the
concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices calculated indicate a lack of competition even
at the four firm level. This imbalance was very pronounced when the size of the companies
audited is considered using their reported total assets. We also present the market shares
of the leading six firms in each exchange and discuss some implications of this disparate
competition.

I. Introduction
Business transactions are becoming international with each passing year,
and capital markets necessarily have followed this trend. As businesses
have grown to take advantage of emerging markets, the need to derive
capital from a variety of sources has increased. Companies, especially
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this paper by Chris Mallin and participants of the International Association of Accounting Education
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reviewers. Thanks also extend to Mr. V.E.L. Narasimhan for his assistance in data entry. Ramesh
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multinationals, have chosen different vehicles to raise capital, one of
which is to list in multiple national exchanges. Already, more than 1,000
companies around the world list their securities in more than one national
exchange (Schweikart et al., 1994, p. 403).
The information needs of investors in the different capital markets, however, remain the same across the countries. One of the information needs
is the availability of reliable information from the companies, attested by
an independent, credible third party; the auditors. The need for audited
financial information is thus universal across the borders. As noted by
Wallace (1980), markets internationally have the same demands from
auditing services: a monitoring mechanism, an information production
mechanism, and an insurance mechanism for protection against losses.
Despite the differences that might exist in financial reporting and disclosure requirements, the nature of the services provided by auditors is
similar across the countries, since the need for the audited financial statements is the same. As capital markets have expanded into all areas of the
world, the need for third-party attested financial statements has grown.
Public accounting firms, particularly the large firms, have thus benefited
from the globalisation trends by expanding their own markets.
The reason frequently mentioned for the mergers of the Big 8 accounting firms to form the Big 6 is that they want to increase their international
presence and be in a better position to service multinationals in different
markets. On the other hand, concerns over the impact of the increasing
concentration of audit services on competition among accounting firms
include the loss of objectivity and independence, and the resulting impact
of this on the value of audited financial statements. Studying auditor concentrations provides an overview of competition for audit services. However, past studies of auditor concentrations, especially after the mergers,
have all been restricted to the U.S. market, despite the fact that the frequently cited reason for the mergers of large accounting firms is growth in
the “international” market. Studies of non-U.S. markets such as Australia
(Gilling and Stanton, 1978), Canada (Shaw and Archibald, 1970), Hong
Kong (Lee, 1994), New Zealand (Gilling, 1970, 1976, 1977, 1985), and
the United Kingdom (Moizer and Turley, 1989) all use data prior to the
mergers of Big 8 firms, and in some cases are clearly very old studies.
This study is the first to attempt to understand the nature of concentration in the market of auditing services on an international basis. As
noted before, all previous studies have either been restricted to the U.S.
market or to individual countries. Although statistics are available on the
total revenues generated by the Big 6 worldwide and the number of public
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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companies they audit in individual countries (Bavishi, 1995), the concentration of the firms in individual stock exchanges has not been looked
at on a global basis. This study extends the previous studies on concentration by examining auditor concentrations in four international stock
markets: Canada, Hong Kong, London, and Singapore. The Canadian
and London stock exchanges are chosen as representatives of the North
American and European markets, while the Hong Kong and Singapore
exchanges represent the newly developed Asia Pacific markets. These
four exchanges are chosen to enable a comparison of exchanges in two
established older non-U.S. markets in the Western World (Canadian and
London) with two newer markets in the Asia Pacific region (Hong Kong
and Singapore). Also, comparable to the U.S. market, each of these four
areas has a similar policy of encouraging minimally government-regulated
competition, which makes it possible to compare the concentrations in
the four exchanges with studies done in U.S. markets.1 This study thus
attempts to yield insights into the growth of Big 6 firms in the international markets, especially emerging markets. Comparing two older and
established markets with the two new and emerging ones will enable us
to understand the competitiveness of the audit firms, especially the Big 6
firms. The Asia Pacific region, where the Hong Kong and Singapore
exchanges are located, has seen a substantial increase in economical
development in the last decade, spurred partly by the economic reforms in
China. Growth in international trade and the need for foreign capital give
an impetus to companies in this region to raise capital from the global
markets. Dopuch and Simunic (1980) assert that the credibility associated
with a (then) Big 8 firm is perceived to be more than that of a non-Big 8
firm. Thus, given the need for an international exposure by companies in
the Asia Pacific region, a study of the concentration of audit firms in the
two newer exchanges may give more evidence on this assertion.
Examining auditor concentration based on selected exchanges, as compared to looking at individual industries, can avoid the following biases,
as suggested by Wootton et al. (1994). First, generalising from the specific
industries to the audit market as a whole often overstates auditor concentration. Second, the assignment of companies to specific industries is
judgmental, which could bias the results. Thus, the “use of a broad diverse
population base (such as a stock exchange) allows the researcher to determine whether auditor concentration is present within an audit market not
merely within a select industry.” (Wootton et al., 1994, p. 60).

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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2. Literature Review
In the United States, concerns are often expressed for concentration of
audit services in the larger accounting firms, particularly the large international accounting firms. The Senate Sub-Committee in its report entitled
The Accounting Establishment (1976) is critical of the domination of the
then Big 8 firms in the audit of large corporations, fearing that excessive
concentration would lead to an increase in the prices of the services provided by the auditors. However, studies such as Dopuch and Simunic
(1980), Danos and Eichenseher (1986), Hermanson et al. (1987), Palmer
(1989), and Maher et al. (1992) challenge this assumption, showing that
there is intense competition among the larger firms, actually resulting in a
decrease in fees over time rather than an increase.
Indeed, around the time of the Senate Sub-Committee’s report, the
AICPA’s Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities notes that there is
“excessive competition among firms to offer lower fees” (AICPA, 1978,
p. 110) as a potential problem affecting auditor independence. Thus,
despite the concerns expressed in the USA about increasing concentration
of auditing services provided by the larger accounting firms, there has
been no corresponding increase in fees that would suggest a problem of
availability of choice amongst firms. No study, however, has looked at
concentration of audit firms in auditing clients worldwide on international
stock exchanges, which is the primary purpose of this study.
Previous studies related to concentration of firms in providing auditing
services have been restricted mostly to the USA. Non-U.S. studies, as
noted earlier, were done mostly in the 1970s and 1980s using data prior to
the mergers. Similar to U.S. studies, they find dominance of the larger
firms in each country. In the U.S., Zeff and Fossum (1967) profile companies listed in the Fortune Directory in four broad industry categories
as 38 specific industries. They find that concentration of large firms
does occur in most industries. This study is later replicated by Rhode
et al. (1974), Schiff and Fried (1976), and Dopuch and Simunic (1980).
Eichenseher and Danos (1981) propose and then test an auditor concentration model across 54 industries. Danos and Eichenseher (1982) also
examine auditor market share changes in 33 industries over a seven year
period while McConnell (1984) studies these changes in the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (ASE), and the Over
the Counter (OTC) markets. McConnell notes an increase in the Big 8’s
market shares in the NYSE and ASE markets, while maintaining it in the
OTC market. However, Campbell and McNeil (1985) investigate the audit
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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market shares of the Big 8 in auditing 650 companies listed in the Fortune
Directory and find no lack of competition amongst them. In the same vein,
Danos and Eichenseher (1986) also conclude it to be a competitive environment after examining the long-term trends in auditing non-regulated
companies.
The mergers of the Big 8 into the Big 6 in 1989 generated heated
discussion concerning the concentration of auditing services in the U.S.
market. Tonge and Wootton (1991) calculate the concentration ratios of
the larger accounting firms after the merger, using pro forma information,
and claim that the merger would have little effect on competition. Similar
conclusions are reached by Minyard and Tabor (1991) who examine the
pro forma concentration of the post-merger accounting firms using a different measure of concentration, the Herfindahl index. However, Copley
(1994), upon examining the issue of availability of audit services at the local
offices’ level after the mergers, contests that there is a reduction of available audit firms in areas where there are four or more pre-merger firms.
Wootton et al. (1994) extend the work of Tonge and Wootton (1991)
and Minyard and Tabor (1991). Instead of using pro forma information,
actual auditor and auditee relationships are used to investigate the change
in the concentration levels of audit firms in auditing listed companies in
the NYSE, ASE, and OTC markets before and after the mergers. Both
concentration ratios and the Herfindahl indices are employed to analyse
the concentration within the large client audit industry. Wootton et al. find
that the top firms have a more balanced market share, while the distinction
between the first-tier firms and the other firms is sharper after the mergers.
3. Methodology
Companies listed on the Canadian and the London stock exchanges in
1994 are obtained from the 1994 series of Compact Disclosure. As the
Disclosure database does not have sufficient information on the Hong
Kong and the Singapore exchanges, information about companies listed
on these exchanges are gathered from The Mees Pierson Guide to Hong
Kong Companies (May 1994 edition) and The Thornton Guide to the Companies of Singapore and Malaysia (March 1995 edition), respectively. The
data sources contain information on a total of 979 companies listed on
the Canadian, 1625 companies on the London, 484 companies on the
Hong Kong, and 239 companies on the Singapore stock exchanges. After
eliminating foreign companies and companies with missing information,
the usable data sets are 957 companies on the Canadian, 1400 companies
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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on the London, 456 companies on the Hong Kong, and 231 companies on
the Singapore stock exchanges, respectively.2
This study uses both concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices to
examine concentration of audit firms in the international stock exchanges.
Concentration ratios are calculated as a percentage of a measurement
base, such as the total number of companies listed on the exchange, or
the sum of total assets of these companies. For example, a four firm concentration of 0.60 for the total number of companies listed on the exchange would indicate that the top four accounting firms audit 60% of all
the companies listed on that exchange.
In contrast, the Herfindahl index (hereafter the H index) reflects “the
sum of squares of the shares of industry output possessed by each firm.
It is a comprehensive measure of firm sizes (with a maximum value of
1 for the index with monopoly and a minimum value of 1/n with n firms
of equal size).” (Stigler 1968, p. 262). Following Eichenseher and Danos
(1981), it is calculated as:
H j = ∑ii ==1n x i2

(1)

where i = firms active in stock exchange j,
xi = the percentage of the total exchange activity accounted for by
firm i divided by 100, i.e. (%/100).
The H index, therefore, is equal to 1.00 if only one firm is active in the
industry, and approaches zero in an industry with numerous sellers of
equal size.
Eichenseher and Danos (1981) show that even though high correlations
exist between the H index and the concentration ratio, the H index has the
ability to show the effect of an uneven market distribution much better
than the concentration ratios. As noted by Minyard and Tabor (1991), a
four firm concentration ration (CR4) of 0.80 could occur either if one firm
has a 60% share and the other three combined a 20% share, or if all four
have an equal 20% share. The H index, however, would be much larger for
the first case, indicating a lack of competition, as compared to the equal
distribution in the latter case. Thus, the concentration ratio would be
unable to distinguish the level of competition among the top four firms
between the first and second instances.
Similar to Wootton et al. (1994), this study also calculates the four, six,
and eight firm concentration ratios and H indices for both the number of
companies and the sum of the total assets for companies listed on the
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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Canadian, Hong Kong, London and Singapore stock exchanges.3 The
results are presented in the next section.
4. Results
We discuss the concentration of audit service based on the concentration
ratios and Herfindahl indices measured by (1) the total number of companies audited and (2) the total assets of these companies for the four
stock exchanges examined: Canadian, London (Western markets) and
Hong Kong, Singapore (Asia Pacific region). In addition, the summary
statistics for the top six audit firms in each exchange are also provided.
4.1 Concentration Ratios
Table 1 presents the results of concentration ratios for the four, six, and
eight leading accounting firms in each of the Canadian, London, Hong
Kong, and Singapore stock exchanges.
As shown in Table 1, the highest concentration of the leading four
accounting firms in auditing the total number of companies audited
occurs in the Hong Kong stock exchange (0.7456), followed by Singapore
(0.7229), London (0.6100), and Canada (0.4681). While the four firm
auditor concentration is high for the first three stock exchanges (around
61–75%), it is only moderate for Canada (about 47%).
In contrast, if the concentration ratio is based on total assets of the companies audited, then the concentration of the leading four accounting firms
in auditing large size companies is very obvious in all four markets examined. In the Hong Kong, London, and Singapore markets, the concentration
ratios are 0.8888, 0.9290, and 0.9375 respectively, indicating that about
Table 1. Auditor Concentration Ratios for Four Stock Exchanges
Auditor Concentration Ratios
Measurement Base
Number of Companies

Total Assets

Stock
Exchanges

4 firms

6 firms

8 firms

4 firms

6 firms

8 firms

Canadian
London
Hong Kong
Singapore

0.4681
0.6100
0.7456
0.7229

0.5810
0.7514
0.9123
0.8961

0.6322
0.8171
0.9452
0.9351

0.7578
0.9290
0.8888
0.9375

0.9872
0.9740
0.9672
0.9882

0.9875
0.9837
0.9734
0.9929

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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89–94% of the total assets held by companies in these regions are audited
by the leading four firms, whereas in the Canadian stock market, this
concentration ratio is 0.7578. The leading four accounting firms in the
Canadian, London, and Singapore markets are all from the Big 6 group
except for Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, one of the leading four audit firms
is a local firm that audits about 13% of the companies listed on the
exchange (about 17.5% of the total assets of companies audited).4
In terms of the number of companies audited, the six firm and eight
firm concentration ratios in the Canadian market increases to 0.5810 and
0.6322 respectively as compared to 0.4681 for the four firm concentration
ratio. In the London market, the six firm and eight firm concentration ratios
increase to 0.7514 and 0.8171 respectively from 0.6100 for the four firm ratio.
These numbers appear to indicate some competition from other firms in
the region. However, upon considering the concentration ratios for the total
assets of the companies audited, it is apparent that the top six firms in both
the Canadian and London markets dominate the audit market as the ratios
jump to 0.9872 for the Canadian and to 0.9740 for the London stock markets. The leading six firms in the Canadian markets are the Big 6 firms,
while five of the Big 6 firms are dominant in the London market. Defining
saturation as the attainment of 90% of the audit market, the London market
attains saturation of competition (by size of the companies audited) at the
four firm level with a 0.9740 concentration ratio. The six firm concentration ratios based on the total assets audited for all these four markets range
from 0.9672 to 0.9882. Therefore, the concentration for audit services at
the six firm level in both the Canadian and the London markets resembles
the NYSE Registrants found by Wootton et al. (1994) at 0.9904 calculated by
square root of revenues. As expected, there is only a marginal increase in
the eight firm concentration ratios for total assets of the companies audited.
As to the Hong Kong and Singapore markets, the six firm and eight firm
ratios for total number of companies audited are 0.9123 and 0.9452, and
0.8961 and 0.9351, respectively. Thus, both the Hong Kong and Singapore
markets attain saturation of competition around the six firm level. However, the concentration ratios for total assets of companies audited indicate
that the saturation could even occur at the four firms level, since the corresponding increases in concentration ratios for six firms (Hong Kong:
0.9672, Singapore: 0.9882) and eight firms (Hong Kong: 0.9734, Singapore:
0.9929) from the four firms level (Hong Kong: 0.8888, Singapore: 0.9375)
are only marginal in both Hong Kong and Singapore markets.
Table 2 presents the market shares of the top six audit firms in each of
the four exchanges, both by total number of companies audited and by
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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total assets of the companies audited. For the Canadian market, the market
shares of the audit firms in terms of total number of companies audited
range from roughly 16% (KPMG) to close to 3% (AA), while they range
Table 2. Market Shares of the Top Six Audit Firms
Panel A: Canadian Stock Exchange
Rank
By Number Audited
1
2
3
4
5
6

KPMG
DTT
EY
CL
PW
AA

16.2%
13.0%
9.1%
8.5%
8.4%
2.8%

Panel B: London Stock Exchange
Rank
By Number Audited
1
2
3
4
5
6

KPMG
CL
PW
EY
DTT
BDO

20.7%
16.4%
12.1%
11.7%
8.9%
5.2%

Panel C: Hong Kong Stock Exchange
Rank
By Number Audited
1
2
3
4
5
6

DTT
EY
PW
KWTF
KPMG
CL

24.1%
20.8%
16.7%
12.9%
11.4%
5.3%

Panel D: Singapore Stock Exchange
Rank
By Number Audited
1
2
3
4
5
6

EY
KPMG
PW
CL
DTT
FKT

22.9%
17.3%
16.9%
15.2%
13.9%
3.5%

By Total Assets
DTT
EY
KPMG
AA
PW
CL

31.3%
16.7%
14.7%
13.0%
11.5%
11.4%

By Total Assets
KPMG
PW
CL
EY
DTT
AA

32.3%
25.6%
22.0%
12.9%
3.0%
1.5%

By Total Assets
KPMG
PW
KWTF
EY
DTT
CL

35.6%
26.3%
17.5%
9.5%
6.2%
1.6%

By Total Assets
PW
CL
KPMG
EY
DTT
FKT

45.5%
27.0%
10.9%
10.4%
3.1%
2.0%

where
AA = Arthur Andersen & Co.; BDO = BDO Stoy Hayward; CL = Coopers & Lybrand; DTT =
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu; EY = Ernst & Young; FKT = Foo, Kon & Tan; KPMG = KPMG Peat
Marwick; KWTF = Kwan Wong Tan & Fong; PW = Price Waterhouse
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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from almost 21% (KPMG) to 5% (BDO) in the London market. Thus,
KPMG Peat Marwick is the leading accounting firm in terms of the total
number of companies audited in both markets. The dominance of market
shares by the top firms is even more pronounced based on total assets of
companies audited where Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (31%) leads in the
Canadian market, while KPMG Peat Marwick (32%) maintains its leadership in the London market.
Panels C and D of Table 2 show the leading six auditing firms in the
Asia Pacific region. In terms of total number of companies audited, the
market shares of the audit firms in the Hong Kong market range from
about 24% (DTT) to 5.3% (CL), while they range from about 23% (EY)
to about 4% (FKT) in the Singapore market. Thus, the leading auditing
firm in the Hong Kong market is Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, while in the
Singapore market it is Ernst & Young. On the other hand, based on total
assets of companies audited, KPMG Peat Marwick leads in the Hong Kong
market with a 36% market share, whereas Price Waterhouse dominates the
Singapore market with a 46% share.
4.2 Herfindahl Indices
As discussed earlier, concentration ratios may not be able to distinguish
the competition within each level of analysis (four, six, or eight firm).
Herfindahl indices, however, could indicate the extent of competition within
each of these levels. For example, at the four firm level, a Herfindahl index
of 0.2500 would indicate that all four top firms have an equal market
share. Whereas a Herfindahl index of 0.1667 and 0.1250 would indicate a
balanced competitive level amongst the top six and top eight firms,
respectively. Indices that are larger than these numbers would then suggest
a lack of equal market shares and hence the dominance of one or more
firms in each level.
Table 3 presents the Herfindahl indices for the four, six, and eight
leading firms in each of the markets for (1) the total number of companies
audited and (2) the sum of the total assets of the companies audited. At
the four firm level, the Herfindahl indices for the total number of companies audited is larger for the Canadian (0.2675) and London (0.2643)
markets than for the Hong Kong (0.2628) and Singapore (0.2565) markets.
Nevertheless, in each case, the index is greater than the equal-share index
of 0.2500, indicating large size variations in the portfolios of each of the
four leading firms in the regions examined. This is evidenced by Table 2
where the market shares of the leading four firms in each market, in terms
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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Table 3. Auditor Herfindahl Indices for Four Stock Exchanges
Auditor Herfindahl Indices
Measurement Base
Number of Companies
Stock
Exchanges
Canadian
London
Hong Kong
Singapore
Index of equal
market share

Total Assets

4 firms

6 firms

8 firms

4 firms

6 firms

8 firms

0.2675
0.2643
0.2628
0.2565
0.2500

0.1973
0.1931
0.1945
0.1924
0.1667

0.1699
0.1668
0.1819
0.1776
0.1250

0.2868
0.2729
0.2983
0.3441
0.2500

0.1960
0.2494
0.2563
0.3111
0.1667

0.1959
0.2446
0.2531
0.3082
0.1250

of the total number of companies audited, are quite different from an
equal market share.
The deviation of the Herfindahl indices from the equal-market index is
even more pronounced when the indices are calculated based on the total
assets of the companies audited at the four firm level. Interestingly, unlike
the indices calculated for the total number of companies audited, the index
is larger for Singapore (0.3441) and Hong Kong (0.2983) as compared to
the London (0.2729) and Canadian (0.2868) exchanges. In each case,
again, the index based on size of companies audited is much larger than
0.2500, implying an uneven distribution of the companies audited by the
four firms in each region. Thus, the competition for large clients is not
evenly balanced across the leading four firms in any of the four regions
studied. In other words, one or more of the leading four firms has a
disproportionately high or low client portfolio as compared to the other
leading firms. This is evident when the market shares are compared in
Table 2 on the basis of total assets audited. The variations in market
shares are quite pronounced in each market.
The deviation of the indices from the equal-market index based on the
number of companies audited is clearly larger at the six firm and eight
firm levels than at the four firm level for all four regions (see Table 3).
This is even more manifest for the proportion of total assets audited in all
but the Canadian market. The Canadian market is the sole exception
where the index is shifting towards the equal-market index when moving
from the four firm level (0.2868) to the six firm level (0.1960). This
implies that, based on total assets audited, the fifth and the sixth largest
firms in the Canadian market have audit portfolios comparable to the
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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smallest of the leading four firms, and is evident in Panel A of Table 2
where the fifth and sixth largest firms in the Canadian market have a
market share of about 11% compared to the 13% share of the fourth largest firm. In the other regions, though, the largest companies are audited by
the leading four firms alone, based on total assets audited, as the indices
barely change moving down from the four firm to six firm level. Panels B,
C, and D of Table 2 confirm this as the market shares of the fifth and sixth
largest firms in each of the three markets are quite small relative to the
leading four firms.
Overall, in all four markets examined, in terms of the number of companies audited, there is a decrease of the indices when moving from the
six firm to eight firm level. Whereas the index hardly changes based on
the proportion of the total assets audited, suggesting a complete lack of
competition for large-sized clients by the seventh and eighth largest firms
in each region.
5. Discussion
Wootton et al. (1994) contend that there is a movement towards a more
balanced competition among the Big 6 firms after the merger in the audits
of companies listed on the NYSE, ASE, and OTC markets. They conclude
that “while the access to the market for audit services appears to be better
balanced among the largest firms as a result of the Big 8 mergers, the
distinction between the first tier firms and other firms is stronger than
ever.” (Wootton et al., 1994, p. 73). In contrast, the results of this study
indicate a more disparate competition amongst the larger firms in each of
the Canadian, Hong Kong, London, and Singapore markets. In all of
the four markets, both the concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices
calculated indicate a lack of competition even at the four firm level. This
imbalance is even more pronounced when considering the size of the
companies audited using their reported total assets. The competition for
large client audits thus appears to be concentrated in less than four firms
in all of these four regions. In fact, other than Canada where there may
be six large auditing firms competing for large audit clients, in the other
three markets this competition is restricted to four firms or less. Further,
unlike the U.S. markets, the competition at this level is not moving
towards a balance. In all four markets examined, the Big 6 firms dominate
the audits of large companies listed on the exchanges, except for Hong
Kong, where the third largest firm was a local firm in 1994. However, with
the merger of this local firm with Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu in 1997, even
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998.
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this market shows the same pattern of Big 6 dominance reflected in the
other markets. One reason for the concentration of the Big 6 firms in
Hong Kong, London, and Singapore could be the need for international
exposure by companies listed on these exchanges which may make them
seek out “brand name” auditors. Future studies in the area of competition
and concentration of auditing services could seek to verify this proposition since we do not explicitly test this here. As in the U.S., the
concentration of larger firms may attract the attention of regulatory bodies
in each region and may imply to them a lack of competition. While studies
in the U.S. have not shown a lack of competition due to the concentration, it may still become an issue in the future as more large firm mergers
are being planned. More research may be necessary on the relationship
between concentration of audit firms and the pricing of audit services to
investigate if the same conclusions can be drawn in international markets
as in U.S.
Our study shows that, irrespective of the nature of the capital market,
new or established, the dominance of the Big 6 firms is unquestionable.
This points to the need for further studies to pattern the competitiveness
of large audit firms to investigate how they penetrate, grow, and compete
in international markets.
Notes
1. For this reason exchanges in Mexico in North America and Japan in Asia Pacific
were not chosen for our study.
2. Foreign companies eliminated all have financial information released in currencies
other than the functional currency of the region of the exchange. They are eliminated to
avoid foreign exchange translation problems, as also the possibility the companies may
have auditors based in their home country rather than the country of listing.
3. Wootton et al. (1994) use the square root of reported revenues as a surrogate measure
for audit fees, an indicator of size of the company audited. However, since banks and other
financial institutions do not report revenues in Hong Kong and Singapore, total assets are
used as a surrogate for the size of the companies.
4. Kwan Wong Tan & Fong (KWTF) was affiliated with the BDO International group
in 1994 but in 1997 merged with Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu.
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